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THE FATE OF COMMUNIST LEADERS


What is the life expectancy of Communist
Party leaders trained for positions of
power at home by foreign Communist powers?

Communist countries have harbored, trained and sent home many a rebel dissident to head Communist regimes. Communists in Exile reports not only on the early purges of these exiles while in the Soviet Union (noted members of the COMINTERN for example) but of those who lived to rule Communist regimes in Eastern Europe -- e.g., Vlko Chervenko in Bulgaria, Anna Pauker in Rumania, Rakosi and Imre Nagy in Hungary, Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia.

All Communist countries today carry on
massive programs to indoctrinate foreign
youth and to train Communists and dissidents
in the hope of establishing them in power
in developing countries.

Youth and dissidents in developing countries might learn something from the history of the fate of CP leaders, presented in this succinct, background booklet, Communists in Exile. Current news of purges in Cuba, Communist China, of dismissals and disappearances in the Soviet Union, would serve as additional material on the fate of Communist leaders.

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Significant Dates ▶

APR

- 1 II Afro-Asian Journalists Conf., Algiers (sponsor: Chicom-Indonesia dominated AAJA) once postponed and still in question.
- 10 International Auschwitz Committee, General Session (FIR, Communist) -- commemorating 20th Anniversary of Camp Liberation, Auschwitz, Poland, 10-11 April 1945.
- 10 IV World Conference of Teachers (World Federation of Teachers' Unions -- FISE, Communist), Algiers 10-14 April; educational tours 16-17 April.
- 11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism ("Day of Remembrance") celebrated annually by International Fed. of Resistance Movements (FIR, Communist).
- 13 II International Conf. for Teaching Resistance History, (sponsored by FIR) Prague, Czechoslovakia, 13-15 April.
- 17 Nikita Khrushchev born, 1894.
- 18 Easter, traditional Peace marches, e.g., Aldermaston (UK) and Western European countries.
- 18 Bandung Conf. (29 Afro-Asian countries call for elimination of colonialism, for self-determination and independence, for UN membership all peoples) 18-27 April 1955. Tenth anniversary. [Note: Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen I reportedly accepted invitations to celebrations in Indonesia.]
- 22 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born. 1870: 95th anniversary. (Died 21 January 1924)
- 24 World Fed. of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Exec. Committee meeting and seminar, Accra, Ghana -- to prepare for 9th World Youth Festival now scheduled mid-summer, Algiers.
- 24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for Peaceful Coexistence celebrated by WFDY and IUS.
- 29-30 Hitler commits suicide. Berlin. World War II. 1945 Twentieth anniversary.

MAY

- Month-long refugee exodus from Communist China to Hong Kong; estimated 70,000 cross border. 1962
- 1 May Day: International Workers' Day. Designated by Second International (Socialist Congress) 1889; first celebrated Western Europe 1890; heavily exploited since close of WW II in Communist countries.
 - 1 Castro proclaims Cuba a socialist nation; no more elections. 1961
 - 2 Berlin falls to Red Army. 1945 (20th anniversary WW II events)
 - 5 USSR Press Day. Commemorating first publication in 1912 of Party controlled paper.
 - 5 Karl Marx born. 1818. Dies 14 March 1883.

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GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#48

Commentary

17 Feb-2 Mar 1965

Principal Developments:

1. The 1 March meeting of the "26-party preparatory commission" is under way in Moscow, -- but it appears to fall far short of the original (and perhaps even the current) Soviet objectives. Though proceedings are shrouded in secrecy, we note:
 - a. Aggravated warfare in Vietnam has made it impossible for Moscow to continue Khrushchev's aloofness;
 - b. The Chinese resumed a flow of belligerent polemics on the eve of the meeting (see para. 2).
 - c. All media of the participants refer only to a "consultative meeting," with no mention of preparing a world conference.
 - d. The 6 parties of the Chinese camp (Albania, China, Indonesia, Japan, N. Korea, N. Vietnam) demonstrated solidarity in boycotting the meeting, despite Kosygin's last-minute plea and an ostentatious Soviet show of solidarity with N. Vietnam and N. Korea. The independent Rumanians also stayed away.
 - e. The British delegation arrived several days after the others, with a public statement that they decided to attend only because the meeting would be consultative and not preparatory. The CPUSA delegates are classed only as observers, but this is probably related to the new U.S. action to prosecute U.S. Communists as agents of a foreign power.
 - f. The group issued a statement on 3 March condemning U.S. imperialism in Vietnam, -- but it did not go as far as recent Soviet statements threatening action in support of N. Vietnam.
 - g. Moscow correspondents are agreed that the meeting is discussing the problems of the movement, but there is little effort to predict the outcome. One, the Yugoslav Borba's, says that the meeting has agreed that it "should prepare draft documents for international CP consultations," but he describes three differing factions on the question of holding a world conference (new euphemism: "international consultations").
2. After demonstratively publicizing an 18 January attack on Khrushchev and the present revisionists by Australian pro-Chinese Communist Hill a week before the meeting date, the Chinese began on the 25th with

a stream of their own anti-Soviet articles, ostensibly commenting on anti-China materials in Soviet (also Czech and Polish) media but filled with vituperative attacks on Khrushchevian revisionism still being followed by his successors. Especially harsh is their prefatory note to their 3rd volume of collected statements by Khrushchev -- see February 25-26.

3. Some unconfirmed clandestine reports indicate that Peking is calling on parties to convene for a rival meeting in Peking in the near future. [There is no hard information on this and the reports can not be accepted without confirmation.]

Significance:

The CPSU finally "succeeded" in at least getting delegates from 18 parties of the 25 invited to come to Moscow for the long-promoted 1 March meeting -- in a world upset by the escalation of warfare in Vietnam and a movement rent by dissensions, doubts and fears, and prodded by a resumption of belligerently hostile Chinese polemics.

On the surface, it might appear that the CPSU leaders have abandoned their original objective of a preparatory meeting to plan for a world conference and have settled for the so-called "consultative meeting" as a face-saving alternative to avoid the appearance of total failure. This would certainly be a further setback of large proportions to Soviet prestige and influence in the world movement, no matter how they might try to divert attention by brandishing the whip of solidarity against the bogey of U.S. imperialism.


However, it is quite possible that the entire Soviet posture at this time -- its one-sided emphasis on unity and on fighting the "common enemy" and its bland "consultative meeting" formulation -- is largely window-dressing, behind which the CPSU is pushing its objective of a world conference just as diligently as ever.

On the basis of present evidence, we can only assume that the chances are slight that the meeting will produce any agreement on a new draft document of a general line for the movement or on specific plans for a world conference. At the same time, we remain fully aware that the continued -- or even more exacerbated -- Sino-Soviet conflict may intensify their competition for "spectacular revolutionary deeds," thereby further increasing additional and enlarged subversion and aggression in all parts of the world.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#48

17 Feb-2 Mar 1965

February 6 (delayed): Italian CP weekly journal Rinascita reports the establishment of a "Committee of Initiative for a New Unity of the Left," based in Milan. Only 3 of the 19 members are from the PCI: 7 are from Nenni's PSI; 3 from Vecchietti's PSIUP (left-wing split from PSI); 4 from Saragat's Social Democrats; and 2 independents. Secretary is Vittorio Orilla, PSI.

February 11 (delayed): Yugoslav Party weekly journal Komunist carries interview with Mario Alicata, Director of PCI daily L'Unita, during Belgrade visit, February 3-8. Asked about the Amendola proposal for creation of a new party to unite the left, Alicata says: "We have agreed that the discussion must be carried forward, but that it is necessary to put it on a more solid basis." He says that "a group of comrades is working on a document which will be discussed in the Party and in public," and reviews briefly and generally the problems to be considered.

February 17: French CP daily L'Humanite publishes a letter signed by about 100 Party intellectuals, mostly professors at the University of Paris, asking for a full debate on the role of intellectuals in the Communist movement, -- together with a strong rebuke by the Politburo.

February 18, 20 and 27: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit publishes 3 editorials denouncing the "Khrushchevite revisionists" for joining with the U.S. imperialists in voting against a motion introduced by the Albanian delegate to the U.N. General Assembly on the 16th. (It called for resumption of normal voting procedures, which had been suspended to avoid a showdown on Article 19. Only one delegation, Mauritania, voted with Albania, with 97 opposed and 13 abstentions.) The Albanians' final blow is the hardest. "The retreat and capitulation of the Khrushchevite revisionists in the face of the imperialist diktat for adjournment... is in itself a very serious act of treason.... The vote on the Albanian motion unmasked the great bluff of the U.S. and the K. revisionists concerning the alleged 'confrontation of the two great powers.'"

ZIP goes on say that now "the Afro-Asian people can understand why the USSR insists so on its participation in the next A-A conference.... (Soviet insistence) means that they intend to weaken and divide the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist front of the people of these continents and to halt and paralyze the revolutionary impetus of their liberation struggle. As in other areas, here too they would like to propagate the revisionist poison of retreat, compromise, and capitulation to and collaboration with imperialism...."

On the 20th, the Peking press supports the Albanian action and mentions only the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia as opposing it, adding that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reached a behind-the-scenes agreement to avoid voting.

(Chronology Cont.)

February 19: Yugoslav Radio's Moscow correspondent Sundic reports that, "despite good connections, or, as is usually stated, reliable sources, foreign correspondents in Moscow have failed until now to learn anything definite about the fate" of the scheduled drafting commission meeting. "It is believed," he says, "that the initiators of the meeting themselves are not so enthusiastic about its taking place." He adds that the question of differences between the majority and the minority of the ICM is not longer of much significance; now it is "the question of certain differences in the ranks of the existing majority."

February 19-20: Moscow publicizes communiqués on CPSU meetings with Portuguese and Finnish CP delegations. Both emphasize unanimity of views on the need for strengthening the unity of the ICM. (The latter was far more expansive, and covered many aspects of state relations as well.)

February 20-22: NCNA on 20th publicizes full text of statement by E.F. Hill, Chairman of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L), published in the 18 January issue of his organ Vanguard, denouncing the CPSU-proposed 1 March meeting. Hill adds:

"... Khrushchev did untold harm, but his advent had its positive side. It revealed clearly the rottenness latent in many Communist parties....

"... The revisionists do not know what to do in the present circumstances. They rush hither and thither, and they disagree among themselves. They can never have unity, for revisionism approaches problems not from any principle, but from case to case."

Peking press publishes on 22nd.

February 21: East German Party daily Neues Deutschland publishes communique on discussions with Danish CP delegation 18-19th. "They established a unanimity of views on basic questions of the Communist movement and on efforts undertaken to consolidate unity and cohesion," but with no specifics.

February 24-25: Swedish press features reportage and commentary on a press conference by Nils Holmberg, veteran Swedish Communist, leader of the Chinese-attuned, hard-line SKP dissidents, attacking the Hermansson leadership for leading the Party into a swamp of revisionism. He calls for a new Party Congress.

February 25-26: NCNA distributes on 25th, and Peking papers print on 26th, three articles describing "anti-China materials" in Soviet, Polish, and Czech media, respectively, and an announcement of Chinese publication of the third volume of Khrushchev's statements, together with the full text of "an explanatory publisher's note" which prefaces the volume -- and which returns to earlier Chinese vituperation.

The note begins by recalling that 2 volumes, covering the period 1932-1953, had been published before K's downfall. They intend to publish "all of the public statements made by K between his assumption of the post of First Secretary of the CPSU/CC and his fall..." which "come to as many as 10 million words, truly a flood of putrid verbosity." Thus, the Chinese collection "will come to as many as 30 volumes," -- and this will not include K's "shameful secret anti-Stalin report" at the 20th CPSU Congress, because "it was never made public by the Soviet Union." The Chinese say that "modern revisionism bears the label of K," and thus the collection will be "an encyclopedia of modern revisionism."

Following a very brief review of the most detested aspects of K's revisionism, the article pays tribute to Mao, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin as positive teachers, but adds that "we also have teachers by negative example in Chiang Kia-shek, the Japanese imperialists, the U.S. imperialists, and those in our party who made the mistake of adopting left or right opportunist lines. Those who belittle the role of teachers by negative example are not thorough-going dialectical materialists...."

The old Chinese sarcasm bursts through:

"We never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and other parties. However, we do want, just a bit, to take up the cudgel on behalf of K. Those who spared no efforts in extolling K. and who had just pinned medals on his chest suddenly about-faced when he fell and gave orders for the confiscation and destruction of all his works, photographs, and portraits. That is not quite the way to do things. Had they not been saying just a few days earlier that K had developed M-L, that K was an outstanding and talented leader and theoretician...? They why ... consign to flames his works running to 10 million words? Can it possibly prove that K revisionism has been thrown overboard?"

"K's forced exit from the world political stage marked the bankruptcy of K revisionism. But the sinister spirit of K has not departed. After all, there are larger or smaller groups of people in the world, in the Soviet Union, even here in China, who believe in K revisionism. Why? Because K revisionism does not owe its origin and growth to any individual or any accidental factor. K's revisionism is a product of the times...."

They close by urging readers not to avoid the works "just because they are such rubbish":

"Khrushchev's statements provide us with a mirror in which to distinguish Khrushchevism without Khrushchev in order to carry the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism through to the end."

One of the other three articles reports that Moscow Television on 22 February and the CPSU magazine Politics Self-taught, No. 12, 1964,

urge Soviet audiences to use the 14 February 1964 anti-China report by Suslov (made at the CPSU plenum) for intensive study. Another reports that the Polish Political and Economic Yearbook for 1964 contains attacks on China. And the third details a charge that "Czech papers have made vile attacks" on the Albanian UN motion described above. "Chiming in with the U.S. imperialists, they alleged that the Albanian delegate had made the proposal at the 'instigation' of China."

February 26: TASS reports that "the latest issue" of CPSU journal Kommunist carries an article extolling the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1950. It stresses Soviet "efforts to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp, of the entire WCM," and "a number of new steps aimed at an improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations." It adds that the CPSU is "pressing for an end to the public discussion inside the WCM."

February 26-27: NCNA expands on its list of Soviet media recommending the use of the Suslov anti-China report, to include Kommunist of the Armed Forces, Kommunist of Belorussia, Kommunist of Soviet Latvia, and Party Life of the Kazakh SSR. It adds that "anti-China books and pamphlets in huge quantities" are available in Soviet bookstores, -- and were available in the Hall of Columns "even on 13 February when a public meeting was held there celebrating the 15th anniversary" of the Sino-Soviet treaty!" Peking press publishes on 27th, and again on March 2.

February 27-March 3: Soviet Premier Kosygin visits East Germany in connection with the opening of the Leipzig Fair. He is accorded so little public attention that speculation is rife: either he is insisting on a new "cult of the nonpersonality," -- or the E. Germans are playing it wary because they are convinced that he's only a short-term interim premier.

February 28-March 1: NCNA distributes and Peking press publishes a slashing 3,000-word denunciation of a "recently published" Soviet "anti-China book, The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class, with B.N. Ponomarev, CPSU/CC Secretary, as its chief editor."

"The book gives great publicity to K. revisionism and attacks the CCP, which upholds M-L, in an all-round, systematic, and foul manner. It abuses by name Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people, and pins on the Chinese leaders many political labels such as neo-Trotskyism, petty bourgeois nationalism, left-opportunism, ultra-revolutionary, capitulationism, theoretical messiahism, adventurism, hegemonyism, nationalism, subjectivism, Chinese dogmatists, Chinese splitters, modern domatists, etc., etc.

"(It)... once again reveals the hypocrisy of those who profess to reinforce the solidarity of the ICM, but in reality do something else. While talking about reinforcing solidarity, they actually deepen the split; while talking about putting an end to the public debate, they intensify anti-China agitation;

"The fact that the editors of the book go to such great pains to boost K revisionism is additional proof that K's downfall merely means a change of signboards and that what is on sale in the shop remains the old wares of K revisionism."

(Editor's note: publication of this book was announced in the issue of Party Life signed to the press on 17 September 1964, a month before K's ouster!)

March 1 and continuing: The controversial "26-party meeting" is under way on 1 March as scheduled, but it appears to fall far short of Soviet objectives. The proceedings are shrouded in secrecy, as usual in such cases, but the following pertinent information has been published:

- a. All public statements in media of the participants refer only to a "consultative meeting," with no mention of preparations for a world conference.
- b. Only 19 parties, including the CPSU, are represented, with some 50 delegates present. Missing are the Albanians, Chinese, Indonesians, Japanese, N. Koreans, N. Vietnamese, -- and Rumanians.
- c. The British delegation arrives 1 March, several days after the others, -- and the CPGB Executive Committee simultaneously releases a statement saying that it decided to send representatives only because it would be a consultative and not a preparatory meeting. The CPUSA delegates are somewhat mysteriously classed as observers rather than participants: the American press comments that this might be related to the new move by the U. S. Justice Department to prosecute U.S. Communists as agents of a foreign power.
- d. On 3 March the meeting issues a joint statement condemning U.S. imperialism in Vietnam, demanding an end to aggression against N. Vietnam and withdrawal of all U.S. personnel from the South. (The statement does not go as far as recent Soviet statements, however, and does not imply any action in support of N. Vietnam.)
- e. Moscow correspondents agree that the meeting is discussing the problems of unity in the movement, ideological differences, and the role of a world conference, but there is little effort to predict the outcome. One of them, Yugoslav Borba's, says on 2 March that the meeting has agreed that it "should prepare draft documents for international CP consultations," and then goes on to describe three different schools of thought on the question of "convening international consultations" (new euphemism for world conference!):


"Some believe that everything should be done to convene international consultations as soon as possible... (which) would afford the opportunity for achieving a minimum joint platform of unity with the CCP and those parties which support it.

"Representatives of other parties consider that international consultations should not be insisted upon unless all parties want them. Until then, Peking's attacks should not be answered and polemics should not be accepted. Representatives of a third group uphold the view that international consultations should not be insisted upon as a form of achieving understanding and compromise, but that concrete and frank discussion of controversial political and ideological issues should be advocated...."

882.

FAILURES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN SOVIET EDUCATION

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* * * * *

SITUATION: Soviet educational practices have sometimes been held up as a model, not least in the United States. American education has had its problems, while Soviet education has consistently taken more interest in the creation of human resources which would strengthen the Soviet state. But all is not well in Soviet education, as various reorganizations and the abandonment of much-publicized reforms show. (See unclassified attachment for detailed discussion of Soviet education.)


Problems faced by Soviet education include:

1. The tendency, contrary to Communist ideology, for higher education to become the prerogative of a closed elite of the children of party and state officials.
2. The incompatibility of Party dogma with training encouraging creativity, imagination and intellectual honesty, and with objective scholarly and scientific research.
3. The disillusionment of much of Soviet youth with the official ideals of the Party.
4. The persistence of antiquated, learning-by-rote methods in academic teaching, with students expected to parrot the words of their instructors.
5. The reduction in the quantity (and therefore also in the quality) of academic teaching.
6. The failure to develop fruitful vocational education.


Some of these problems, particularly No. 5, arise largely from the national shortage in young manpower, and the lack of good teachers, consequences of World War II and of Stalin's sacrifice of millions of potential parents and teachers in deportations and slave labor camps. Another problem, which concerns all the rest of the world, is the one-sided political indoctrination of the population of the world's second strongest military power, with dangerous implications for future world stability.

There are some hopeful developments in Soviet education. The grip of Trofim Lysenko on Soviet biology seems at last to be broken, and F. Burlatsky has advocated (in Pravda 10 January 1965) developing political science as an independent discipline, although still in a Marxist-Leninist

framework. It is in the interest of the US that Soviet education become more open to opposing viewpoints and more adequate for the world of today. It is not in the interest of the US that the Soviet Union should be regarded as an educational model for other, especially developing, countries. 25X1C10c



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883 AF,FE,NE,WH OAS REPORTS: SINO-SOVIET
25X1C10b CONFLICT INCREASES COMMUNIST VIOLENCE



SITUATION: A recent publication of the Organization of American States has focused attention on an aspect of the quarrel between the USSR and Communist China that has been generally neglected. In a report on "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and its Influence on Communist Activities in the Americas" the Special Consultative Committee on Security examines, country by country, the various aspects of Communist subversion in Latin America and concludes: "...that the dispute between China and the Soviet Union has not diminished the subversive activities of international communism in the Americas, but that, on the contrary, it constitutes, in many countries, a greater incentive for the use of methods of violence."

It has been said that the Communist has no philosophy; he has only a method and a goal. Certainly the factionalism that divides the Communist parties of Latin America is less a result of differences in ideology than in methods. The goal has remained the same: to bury the free world. The dispute has been largely concerned with how to go about it: predominantly through peaceful subversion and infiltration, including elections, as Moscow holds; or through terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and other forms of violence, as Peking insists. We should not overlook that this is not simply an ideological dispute. More basically, it is a conflict between two countries both of which are seeking control over the World Communist Movement and, through it, world domination. With regard to the methods advocated by each side, the OAS report recognizes:

In effect, the Soviet line, by opposing the Chinese Communist line in favor of the use of force, would appear to imply that Russia has renounced the use of force, whereas the truth is that Russian Communism continues its efforts toward world domination regardless of methods.

The majority of the top leaders of the Communist parties in Latin America continue to favor the Soviet position. Pro-Chinese elements have come closest to seizing leadership in Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. In each of these three countries there are two separate Communist factions, each claiming to be the official party and expelling the other. In Venezuela, the dominant faction, although nominally loyal to Moscow, has supported for several years a policy of urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare. However, as a result of the failure of the policy of violence to affect the elections of December 1963, the Venezuelan CP is currently trying to improve its image by calling for a suspension of terroristic acts in the

cities. Even so, it is actively supporting guerrilla warfare in the rural areas. In Colombia, a split in the Communist youth movement put the Chinese faction in a dominant position and brought on a wave of violence in rural areas and against U.S. companies.

In all five of the above countries, as well as in a few others mentioned in the report, rivalry between the two factions of the Communist movement apparently causes either an actual increase in violence or a vastly increased potential for violence and guerrilla warfare. In Peru, for example, the potential has certainly increased, although overt violence is currently inhibited by a particularly stable political situation.

Most Latin Americans, the OAS report points out, are still living in the era of the caudillo -- the political boss, the man on horseback. Certainly they are more prone to follow a flesh-and-blood leader than an abstract ideal. Moscow has cleverly exploited this tendency by building up the personality of Fidel Castro, who for millions of Latin Americans, particularly the radical youth, is a sort of new Messiah. Castro-Communism, or fidelismo, as it is more commonly called, is usually identified with advocates of violence, whether of the Moscow or the Peking persuasion.

The meeting of Latin American Communist parties which took place in Havana in November 1964 [Reference C] apparently marked a change in tactics: certain sections of the communique have been interpreted as calling for a shift in emphasis in some countries from legal and peaceful, to illegal and violent, methods to be used by the national parties in the pursuit of Communist goals. This does not mean that the Soviet directed parties had ever renounced the use of force or that they now abjure legal means: they use the tactic best suited to their objective at a given time and place.

In addition to the new dangers that may have arisen as a result of competition, the OAS report concedes -- courageously, since it was written predominantly by Latin Americans -- that the United States, with a politically sophisticated population, can afford the luxury of dissent in the form of a Communist party: it has "greater internal immunity" than its neighbors to the south:

"The special position of the United States, and its independence in developing its own policy, can have an effect on the rest of the American countries by contributing to the formation of a false concept of the 'peaceful coexistence' advocated by Russia."

Also, that phase of the schism which projects the image of a China advocating violent revolution and a Russia advocating more peaceful approaches to the same goal may make the unwary Latin American think ... "that Russia has renounced the use of force."

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15 March 1965

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II AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCEWill Malaysia be Allowed to Participate?More on Algiers as Site for International Conferences

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SITUATION: Six Forums for Sino-Soviet Conflicts. Algiers is the venue for six international conferences during 1965, most of which could provide a setting for extending Sino-Soviet quarrels, or at least for intense rivalry to dominate international organizations. The conflict has already disrupted preparations for the conferences, has caused delays, and has become a source of embarrassment to Algeria. Ben Bella is trying hard to avoid becoming exclusively aligned with either Moscow or Peking. Algerian inability to complete accommodations for a March meeting of Afro-Asian heads of state effectively postponed this group's decision as to whether the essentially European Soviet Union should be invited to this II Afro-Asian Conference (II Bandung) -- perhaps the most important of the six conferences as the only govt.-to-govt. meeting.

Afro-Asian Conferences. Many African and Asian nations deplore that, in recent years, international and Afro-Asian conferences have degenerated into propaganda forums for Sino-Soviet differences; with such prospects in view, they probably welcomed having the Conference delayed until 29 June, although their foreign policies are not too dissimilar from those of the host, Algeria. Others, like India, clearly prefer no conference to one that would be dominated by the Chicom or Indonesian organizers. The co-sponsoring Indonesians, who have supported the Chicom stand on exclusion of the Soviet Union, have been consistently eager to have the long planned Conference convened as soon as possible. They regard it as a major platform for calling a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) and reiterating their policy of confrontation against Malaysia, which they have labeled a puppet of "imperialism" and, thus, ineligible to attend.

Malaysia Attendance. Between now and 24 June when the decision-making Foreign Ministers meeting is convened, both the Soviet Union and Malaysia will work to convince Afro-Asians that they should be included at the II Afro-Asian Conference. The Soviet Union can present its case in many ways. It can enlist influential nonaligned nations, like India -- or Yugoslavia for that matter -- to work in its behalf; it can remind other countries, which receive substantial Soviet aid, that their benefactor wants to be invited. Compared with the Soviet Union, Malaysia

has limited capabilities for waging its campaign for acceptance. However, a strong Malaysian bid is important because, if Malaysian acceptance seemed imminent or were to be accomplished, the Indonesians might withdraw or, as the main organizer, force a further postponement. No matter what the Indonesian reaction, the presence of Malaysians at the II Afro-Asian Conference would be a victory for moderate and pro-Western forces.

Malaysia's strongest argument is that it is an (Afro-) Asian nation. It has economic problems, like over-specialization, that are common to many of the Afro-Asian nations; being an ethnically mixed society (Malays, Indians, Chinese), its social and political difficulties are similar to those of other Afro-Asian societies. Indonesia's essentially propagandistic assertion that Malaysia is dominated by a neo-colonialist, imperialist power (Great Britain) has little meaning when subjected to closer examination: of its own choosing, Malaysia may retain ties (e.g. defense) with the United Kingdom; as a member of the Commonwealth, it has this privilege as do all former British colonies; former French colonies enjoy similar special relationships with France. A more positive view finds that such arrangements basically are another form of foreign aid. The contention that Malaysia is an artificial creation is irrelevant: as a political entity, it is no more artificial than many other former colonial Afro-Asian nations, Indonesia included.

Indonesia's case against Malaysian attendance is weak, but, more important, it is only a facade behind which Indonesian antagonism toward Malaysia is ill concealed. Indonesian-Malaysian hostilities should not be allowed to prevent Malaysia's attending. Differences, of comparable magnitude, exist between other Afro-Asian nations [e.g. between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia], but their names appear on the invitation list as they should. One of the purposes of the II Afro-Asian Conference is to explore those areas (economic, social and technical) where these countries can cooperate despite political differences. Seen in this light, Malaysia has the required credentials, and, turning to the positive, its potential for contributing usefully to attacking common Afro-Asian problems, in the economic field for instance, is far greater than ultra-nationalistic Indonesia's.

Malaysia should be able to capture the sympathies of many Afro-Asian nations. With behind-the-scenes assistance from Britain, particularly among Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth, Malaysia has been and is now actively seeking support. To this end, Deputy Prime Minister Razak departs for East Africa in the middle of March. Already numerous Afro-Asian nations have indicated that they will vote for Malaysia, with India as an especially strong proponent of Malaysia's cause.

Theoretically, any nation which is not committed to the Chicom/Indonesian "axis" should be willing to back Malaysia's bid. Indeed, many who would find Soviet presence questionable, think that Malaysia should be invited. Indonesia's recent withdrawal from the United Nations (UN) because Malaysia became a member of the Security Council may work in Malaysia's favor. Those Afro-Asian nations aspiring to a policy of non-alignment, i.e. seeking to prevent becoming a battleground for influence

between East and West and between Moscow and Peking, wish to rely on the continued existence of the United Nations. As a consequence, they have expressed disapproval of Indonesia's actions and are likely to be less open to Indonesian petitions against Malaysia. Algeria itself, as host to the Afro-Asian Conference, has taken steps to lessen Indonesia's chances for either keeping Malaysia away or launching CONEFO as a competitor to the UN: Algeria officially notified Malaysia that the March meeting would be postponed, and has also asked U Thant and Quaison-Sackey, Afro-Asians holding the two highest offices in the UN, to come to Algiers to the Conference.

Algerian Strategy. Algeria's posture toward the II Afro-Asian Conference is symptomatic of a general strategy that it seems to be evolving (to cope with the complications that have arisen from its play for a leading role in African affairs): Algeria's policy toward the Afro-Asian Conference has been to delay until moderate pro-Afro-Asian elements can be brought in to insure that neither of the major Communist powers will have a free hand, perhaps if only to maximize its own role in international (front) meetings. Originally they may have encouraged the location of Chicom and Soviet backed propaganda centers (i.e. African headquarters for international Communist front organizations) and the rash of conferences in Algiers with a view to deriving advantages from both the Soviets and the Chicoms. From the Soviets, the Algerians receive substantial economic and military aid; the Chicoms give only token aid, but their militant program for purging Africa of "colonialism" and "neo-colonialism" reinforces Algeria's "manifest destiny." Algeria's current handling of the Conference problem may not be entirely to Moscow's liking but, on balance, is likely to be more in its favor than Peking's.

Of the five international Communist front meetings thus far scheduled for Algiers in 1965, three could very easily be disrupted by the Sino-Soviet dispute. Preparations for the Ninth World Youth Festival in July have already been afflicted. As a possible consequence and also to ensure that the International Preparatory Committee (dominated by the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of Students) accepts a modicum of an African orientation of the Festival, the Algerian Preparatory Committee seeks to assert a role of "co-determination." At the recent Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in February, where the Chicoms refrained from their usual harangue, the Algerians seemed to be in control. Of other vulnerable conferences, the Afro-Asian Women's meeting has been postponed from April to June, undoubtedly to Algeria's satisfaction, and reportedly the Afro-Asian Youth Conference, which is not yet firmly scheduled for Algiers, will go begging.

The Algerians have no apparent ready capability for imposing their control over the other two front conferences now planned for April, the Fourth Conference of the Soviet-manipulated World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE) and the Chicom-Indonesian-dominated Second Conference of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA). In the former, the Soviets will probably hew to their usual tactic of not initiating debate of the Sino-Soviet rift and, generally, trying to suppress the attempts of others to do so. At the journalists' meeting, the Chicoms will be more

likely to attack the Soviet "revisionists." The spotlight on the Sino-Soviet squabble would leave an irritated Algeria in the shadows and the majority of the Afro-Asian delegations deeply disappointed.

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
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HANOI'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

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SITUATION: The NFLSV was created on the instructions of the Communist Party of North Vietnam to be the political arm of the Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam. The NFLSV, headquartered in Hanoi, continues to expand its foreign missions and now has permanent representation in Algiers, Berlin, Cairo, Djakarta, Havana, Moscow, Peking and Prague. These missions are staffed by skilled and active propagandists who hold press conferences, organize photo exhibits, write letters to editors, go on lecture tours, organize leaflet and pamphlet mailing operations, arrange "documentary" film showings, and undertake countless other activities to show the "brutality and terrorism of the U.S. and their puppets" in South Vietnam and to publicize the valiant struggle of the "South Vietnamese patriots" under the direction of the NFLSV. In all of this activity they are given extensive support by Hanoi in the form of photographs, letters from eye-witnesses, testimonials from survivors of "the innocent victims of U.S. bombing" and so forth.

Recently the NFLSV representatives in foreign countries have attempted to project themselves as the legitimate government of South Vietnam and the only true spokesman for the South Vietnamese people. To support this image they have publicized a complete program of political and economic objectives. No foreign state has yet recognized the NFLSV as the government for South Vietnam, but a number of Communist-originated news releases on the Front say that "many governments" already consider the NFLSV to be the "real government" and the international missions of the Front to be "the real diplomatic envoys of South Vietnam." NFLSV propaganda regularly stresses that "over one-half the population and two-thirds of the territory of South Vietnam are under the control of the Front." Extensive publicity was given Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett's interview with Ngyuen Huu Tho, head of the NFLSV, in which Burchett referred to Tho as the "de facto Premier of most of South Vietnam" and to the NFLSV as "to all intents and purposes a government." The establishment of a provisional government is undoubtedly part of the Communist strategy for South Vietnam and they clearly would like to have it established before any international conference on South Vietnam takes place in order to demand a role for the NFLSV in the proceedings. This is confirmed by the fact that special groups of administrative cadres and governmental specialists are now regularly included among the personnel infiltrated from North Vietnam. (See unclassified attachment for additional details.)

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Fact Sheet

15 March 1965

Soviet Education

Under Khrushchev, Soviet education underwent much the same impulses, negative and positive, as Soviet agriculture. On the one hand there was Khrushchev's penchant for ignoring the advice of competent advisors, and for trying short-cuts. On the other side, there was evidence of his desire to break with the Stalinist pattern of bureaucratism and New Class privilege. In education, Khrushchev was defeated even before his replacement as Chairman and First Secretary.

Proposed Reforms of 1958. In September 1958, in the heyday of his power, Khrushchev proposed a number of reforms in Soviet education. First, compulsory education was to be extended from seven years -- the legal ideal, which was often not met in practice -- to eight years, after which most children would go to work (age 15). Second, secondary education (to run from the ninth to eleventh year inclusive) should be centered on part-time evening and factory schools and correspondence courses, with only a small number of full-time secondary schools for especially gifted children. Third, no one should be admitted to a university or higher school without two years post-secondary, full-time experience in production work, and the first half of university education should be part-time, with students also doing production work during that period. At that time public criticism of Khrushchev's proposals was practically unheard-of, but nevertheless certain educators spoke up and without naming the First Secretary, argued against the ideas of combining work and study, of establishing schools for the gifted, of interrupting education for work, and of evening schools. Perhaps the critics were emboldened to speak by the fact that ideas similar to Khrushchev's had been tried out in the period of the First Five Year Plan, and had been abandoned. Such criticism, in the USSR, is also likely to reflect the existence of undercover support in very high quarters, such as the CPSU Presidium.

New Class Threatened. While much of the criticism reflected sound educational principles, it was supported by other considerations, too. Khrushchev had challenged the Soviet New Class in an area in which any privileged class will ardently defend its privileges -- its right to pass on a privileged status to its children. In the post-revolutionary period, when a working-class background was required to enter a university, some parents forged personal documents to enable their children to continue their education. Stalin dropped the ban on students of "undesirable social origin" in December 1935, and fees were introduced for secondary education in October 1940, in effect making such education the prerogative of the New Class. The fees continued to be required until June, 1956; their removal increased the number seeking secondary and higher education. Now Khrushchev was proposing to go further, and to require those whom he called "the white-handed ones" -- the children of the elite -- to do full-time manual labor for two years and part-time work for longer periods. Like other more or less self-made men, N. S. Khrushchev was a great believer in the "school of hard knocks," and somewhat

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resentful of those who had never toiled with their hands. His proviso for full-time schools for gifted children was poor consolation for the New Class; after all, their children might not all be gifted.

Actual Reforms of 1958. As it turned out, the legislation on educational reform, passed in November 1958, significantly modified Khrushchev's original plans. All students were given the right to proceed to secondary education after graduating from eight-year schools; regular secondary schools were retained, though now devoting one-third time to "theoretical and practical production work"; schools for the gifted were omitted (except for a few later experiments, and for schools in the arts, which already existed); two years of production work gave preference for university entrance, but was not absolutely required; the requirement for practical work at the university level was slightly relaxed. In the case of students in the liberal arts, much less vocational work was expected. Thus the main framework of secondary education was preserved, though with some impairment, and the over-all educational process was given a hybrid, trade school cum theoretical character. Loopholes remained open for the children of the New Class.

Criticism. The system did not prove a success. By 14 September 1962, Academician A. L. Mints was complaining in Izvestia that vocational training was having an adverse effect on academic standards. In January 1964, four directors of Moscow secondary schools contributed an article to Komsomolskaya Pravda in which they complained that the quality of education had deteriorated badly. Under the program inaugurated in 1958, students in secondary schools were spending four days a week in classrooms and two days in nearby factories, often simply killing time and picking up bad habits, such as drinking. On 31 January 1964, Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that at the Riga Electrical Plant seventh year pupils learned in one day how to perform operations on which eleventh year secondary students had spent two years.

Neither were there any compensating advantages for the economy. Since Soviet factories are often very large, employing almost everyone in the area, schools often had only one factory to which they could send their students. The reaction of the students to their exposure to a factory was usually a resolve to avoid at all costs spending their lives in that factory. One school sent 185 students to be trained in clothing and electric clock manufacture; only 18 remained in these trades. Out of 73 trainees at the Sverdlov plant, only one stayed on. Often the training seems to have been make-work activity, using obsolete machinery. Only one narrowly circumscribed specialty was learned, rather than general skills useful in a variety of jobs. At the same time, qualified employees have been needed to train the students, and they and material resources have been diverted from production. More serious, the whole educational process was prolonged, keeping youth from genuinely productive labor at a time when the manpower shortage, due to the drop in births during World War II, was becoming extremely acute.

New Reforms 1964. By the beginning of 1964, there were symptoms (such as the publication of critical articles) indicating that the 1958 reforms were being reconsidered. On 20 June 1964, a decree appeared reducing the time of study in advanced schools and universities by cutting down on the amount of time spent in production work. On 13 August, Izvestia published a similar decree for secondary education, reducing it by a year, mainly by trimming down vocational work. Since pre-secondary schooling remains at eight years, secondary schools are now expected to cover their curriculum in two years, probably the world's shortest secondary school program. Actually the main reduction in secondary training did not occur in 1964, but in 1958 when the custom of spending one third of the school week in factories was introduced. Another current development is the "schools of the prolonged day," largely for small children, which keep the pupils until 7 or 8 p.m., when their parents come home. These also serve to replace another favorite plan of Khrushchev's, that for the boarding schools or so-called internats, which were generally supposed to give priority to children from lower-income families, and which were designed to build "New Soviet Men" by completely controlling the child's environment; the internats have proven too costly to operate on a large scale, though some still continue. To meet the problem of the shortened secondary school program, some secondary studies are being transferred to the seventh and eighth years, and (since December 1964) some are simply being dropped, including elements of algebra, geometry, a survey of foreign literature, and the study of Deamyan Bedny, Khrushchev's favorite poet.

Holdovers and Continuing Problems. One important element of the 1958 system, an expanded system of night and correspondence schools, still remains. It serves part to provide refresher work for those who are completing their two years in the factory between secondary and advanced training. These schools, too, have come in for complaints: on February 1965, Pravda noted that the standards for evening school graduates were lower than those for graduates of day schools, and that many pupils abandon these schools without completing the course. There is no sign, however, that the regime will abandon these schools.

Various subjects on the curriculum have recently been criticized, including agriculture (in connection with the ouster of Lysenko), language (Pravda, 15 January 1965), mathematics (Pravda, 25 November 1964), and composition (Izvestia, 17 May 1964). A general shortcoming of Soviet education seems to be that there is too much learning by rote, and too little opportunity for independent thought. While a few Soviet scientists are unquestionably of top quality, the level of ordinary technicians does not measure up with that of the West. In 1962-1963, Paul Metzger, a Swiss engineer, spent five months directing the installation of the automated controls of a chemical plant at Balakovo, 900 kilometers east southeast of Moscow. Metzger reported: "The training of a Soviet engineer compared at best with that of a Swiss trained mechanic; a Soviet

trained mechanic knew less about how to do things than an untrained Swiss worker." While Metzger's own observation was limited to Balakovo, Soviet co-workers assured him that conditions were the same all over the USSR. The exceptional students and graduates are likely to be the children or proteges of elite scientists. A special school was established in Moscow in 1963 to give instruction in advanced mathematics and physics to 14 and 15-year-olds; a Soviet teacher reporting on the results stated that the pupils were mostly from the families of mathematicians, but were by no means all prodigies.

Privilege and Influence. In any society which has social inequalities -- and the USSR is one of these societies -- the children of the privileged have advantages. Mothers are at home to take care of the children; they and the fathers are better able to tutor their offspring; the parents do more to enrich the cultural experience of the children and expose them to the attractions of science and the arts; the children are more likely to have quiet places to study; they will be able to buy their own books instead of having to wait to use library copies; and the parents will be more aware of the advantages of education, and will prod their children into studying harder. In the USSR more than in most countries, the children in a few cities (such as Moscow and Leningrad) have better opportunities than other children out in the provinces. Also, in the USSR blat or personal influence can go a long way, and there are several crucial points at which this influence may come to bear.

After completing the general primary eight-year course, the student (at about age 15) who continues his education may go into one of three different kinds of schools: evening schools for individuals working full-time on farm or in factory, diplomas from which do not entitle their possessors to compete for entry into institutions for higher education; technicums which give specialized and relatively advanced technical or managerial training, and the majority of whose graduates do not go on to higher institutions; and general education secondary schools, which continue to stress academic qualities, and whose graduates form most of that 20 per cent which is excused from two years' labor experience. (There are also factory training programs for those not proceeding with a secondary education.) About one third of those leaving eight-year schooling enter one of the three kinds of secondary schools, and of this third, half or more go into the first category, and 25 per cent or less into each of the last two. The Soviet New Class naturally uses its influence to get its children into the last two types of school, and especially into the last one.

Another point of selection comes at entrance into higher institutions. Prestige schools, like the Moscow State University, have four or more candidates for every vacancy, while certain provincial teachers' training schools have fewer applicants than vacancies. Soviet officials

pull whatever wires they can to get their children into prestige institutions without performing the two years of manual labor. It is worth noting that students who succeed in continuing their education without interruption into post-graduate work can usually evade being drafted for military service.

Character Recommendations. A Khrushchevian measure, still in effect, makes university admission dependent on character recommendations from Party officials, the Komsomol, trade unions, and heads of plants or collective farms. Party officials also sit on examining boards. The most hard-working and competent workers are supposed to be selected for higher schools, -- also the most politically reliable. As Khrushchev stated in November 1956, "We should admit to higher education only the best among the best of those who are dedicated to the cause of Lenin." Further, plants or collective farms may subsidize a certain number of their workers in study at higher schools, and these need not compete with other applicants for entry; upon graduation, they are required to return to their former place of work. In many cases, the "higher schools" to which such workers are sent are specialized trade schools, not representative of the top level of Soviet education. It is obvious, however, that the general requirement for character recommendations from party hacks and factory bureaucrats tends to stifle creativity and intellectual honesty. The worst feature is the premium placed on Party orthodoxy, reinforcing the efforts of the Soviet educational system to place ideological blinders on the youth. Academic freedom, so highly prized by professors and students elsewhere, is completely missing. Free dialogue and debate, essential for intellectual maturity, are absent.

Educational Crippling. That part of the official propaganda which seeks to glorify labor and the party leadership probably has little effect. Soviet society blatantly contradicts this aspect of the indoctrination program. But other parts, dealing with the theory of economics, modern history, politics, literature, and philosophy, are highly successful. The picture of the world outside the Bloc is grossly distorted, and in this case, there is little available information to contradict the official picture. In studying the origins of World War II, for example, the Soviet student is taught that the British, French, and Americans tried to use Hitler in an effort to induce him to attack and defeat the Soviet Union: e.g., "The British Government wanted no part of any collective measures [against Anschluss], for, like the U.S. and French governments, it was bent on encouraging Hitler's aggressions" (G. Deborin, The Second World War, pp 26-27). The study of foreign literature was (see above) one of the first things to be dropped when the curriculum was curtailed. The state publishing houses produce a flood of literature on such themes as "Communism is the Future of Mankind," while non-Communist publications are almost completely unavailable. One result of this sort of education is a kind of xenophobia which is sometimes a problem for the regime itself; it is no accident that African students at Lumumba University have found themselves treated as savages of an inferior race. Another result is an incapacity for sophisticated thought in politics,

economics, and philosophy: there is not enough competition in ideas, and there is too much reliance on shibboleths and generalizations, a prominent feature of Marxist education. A soviet general writing a serious article about anti-missile missiles states that it would be bad for "aggressors" to have such weapons, but that it is proper for "peace-loving countries" to have them; obviously he means that the capitalist nations belong in the former category, and the Communist countries in the latter. What is alarming is that after years of conditioning, he may really think that non-Communist countries are always aggressors -- and therefore fair targets for preventive attack as soon as the USSR is strong enough. In order to shackle the non-Communist press, the Soviets have proposed a ban on "war propaganda," but there is actually no place where there is more spreading of hatred and glorification of "good" wars, (e.g., "wars of national liberation") than in the USSR.

15 March 1965

Hanoi's National Liberation Front Expands Operations

In September 1960, at a North Vietnamese Communist Party Congress, Party First Secretary Le Duan called for the creation of a "broad united front" in the South which would have as its ultimate goal the establishment of a "national democratic coalition government." In response to Le Duan's instructions, the Viet Cong on 20 December 1960 publicly proclaimed formation of the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam." Shortly thereafter, Hanoi's news and propaganda outlets began to applaud and commend every statement and action undertaken by the Front. In February 1961, the NFLSV issued its "Manifesto," a document that bears remarkable similarity to the phraseology and the substance of Le Duan's speech.

The Front's most important tasks, according to the Manifesto, were to overthrow the Government in Saigon and form a "broad national democratic coalition administration" to "negotiate" with North Vietnam on "reunification" of the whole country. This objective of reunification of Vietnam under Communist control has not been changed; on the contrary, it has been made increasingly clear and insistent. This fact should provide ample discouragement to anyone who believes that a "neutralist" solution can be negotiated that would leave South Vietnam free from interference from the North.

The domestic tasks outlined in the Manifesto included all of the pet slogans that Communists list in such documents: land reform, full employment, low rent, democracy, and social justice. It also pledged a general amnesty for all political prisoners and the elimination of foreign cultural influences.

The operation of the NFLSV has been patterned after earlier models used by Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants. To fight against the Japanese during World War II, Ho operated behind the facade of the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), which he cast aside when it was no longer useful. Then in 1946, he formed the Lien Viet (Vietnamese United Front), this time to mask the Communist direction of the war against the French.

The Communist background of the ostensible leaders of the NFLSV is a well-documented matter of public record. Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho is a pro-Communist lawyer who has been involved in Communist political activities in Vietnam since 1947. The first Secretary General, Nguyen Van Hieu, has been a Communist propagandist since 1945 with both the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong. Current Secretary General and Vice Chairman of the Front Huynh Tan Phat has been involved in subversive activities since the 1930's and is a crypto Communist. Other leaders of the Front have similar records.

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The NFLSV is of course said to be the spokesman for an exceedingly wide range of South Vietnamese organizations, including for example, Students and Pupils for Liberation, Peasants Union for Liberation, Association of Patriotic and Democratic Journalists, Writers and Artists for Liberation, Labor Unions for Liberation, Vietnamese Nationalists of Chinese Origin for Liberation, Association for the Restoration of Buddhism and Hoa Hao, and so on almost ad infinitum. But many of these are not really groups at all; they do not have memberships such as bona fide organizations do, nor do they represent those people engaged in the activity which their name implies, even where there is such an activity. These "organizations" are in reality small staffs with very little public participation; while their function is to create propaganda, one of their most important reasons for existing is simply to be a "member" of the NFLSV. The tactic is used to give the impression that the Front represents every social, ethnic, religious, professional, political, and economic group in South Vietnam. The complete lack of support for the NFLSV in South Vietnam has been made perfectly obvious on many occasions, but perhaps never more clearly than on the overthrow of the Diem government. The Military Revolutionary Committee, in the first hours after the coup, issued a declaration restoring democratic freedoms and calling on all the South Vietnamese people for support. The truly democratic groups that has been banned by Diem and the real patriots who had been exiled returned to South Vietnam to assist in reorganizing the government and establishing viable institutions to serve the people. None of the constituent members of the NFLSV made any attempt to participate in these affairs.

The most significant "member" of the NFLSV is the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which was formed in early 1962 and openly admits its Marxist-Leninist lineage from the original Indochinese Communist Party and from the Communist Lao Dong Party of North Vietnam. Hanoi and the Front itself try to give the impression that the PRP is only a routine member and that it has no more influence than allegedly non-Communist elements in the organization. Captured Viet Cong documents belie this masquerade by stating clearly that the PRP only poses an independent party and that it is in fact the Lao Dong Party apparatus in South Vietnam; these documents are equally explicit about the PRP's "vanguard role" in the affairs of the NFLSV. This being the case, Hanoi's attempt to create the appearance of a popular front is further exposed.

Internationally, the NFLSV has permanent missions in Algiers, Berlin, Cairo, Djakarta, Havana, Moscow, Peking and Prague. These offices are staffed primarily by propagandists who give lectures, write articles, arrange showings of "documentary" films, and numerous other typical propaganda activities all designed to show that all blame for the situation in South Vietnam lies with the "U.S. and their puppets," and to prove that the NFLSV is the "true representative of the South Vietnamese people."

The Communists are currently stepping up the activities of the Front, particularly those activities designed to give it the appearance of being the legitimate government of South Vietnam. Much publicity is given to statements that the NFLSV is "considered by many people to be the real government of South Vietnam" or that the NFLSV representatives in foreign countries are "received as the real diplomatic envoys of South Vietnam." All of this is part of the Communist plan to insist on a prominent role for the NFLSV in any discussions or negotiations that may take place on the Vietnamese situation. The Front can be expected to do its utmost to carry out the instructions originally given it by the Communist Lao Dong Party of North Vietnam to form a "coalition" government and reunite itself with North Vietnam. They do not say so, but there can be no doubt that the reunification will take place only on Communist terms and would mean Communist rule in South as well as North Vietnam.

For additional background material see:

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Cambridge, Mass., 1963.

The Last Confucian, Denis Warner, Collier-MacMillan,
1963 London, 1963.